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AB STRACT
InMarch 1985, the failure of the Ohio Deposit Guarantee Fund (the ODGF)
sent shock wavesreverberating through the financialworld. This episode is
popularly interpreted as evidence of the dangers of both private deposit insurance
and continuing financial deregulation. Thispaper argues that policies of financial
deregulation played little role in the ODGF insolvency. The failure of the ODGF
was instead a failure of government regulation, rooted in inadequacies in the OGDF
information and enforcement systems.
The ODGF may be conceived as the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation writ small.Both agencies share many of the same structural
imbalances:large unresolved losses, explicitly mispriced and underreserved
services, inadequate information and monitoring systems, insufficient disciplinary
powers, and a susceptibility to political pressures to forbear.
Doctors perform autopsies on dead patients to improve their ability to
protect living ones. This paper's autopsy of the institutional corpse of the ODGF
focuses on identifying the kinds of disturbances that transform structural im-
balances into a full-fledged crisis.Our research underscores the way that
deceptive accounting and underfinanced insurance funds contain crisis pressures in
the short run by setting the stage for more severe problems down the line. As
financial markets approach more and more closely the perfect andcomplete
markets beloved by finance theorists, the amount of time that can bebought by
policies that merely defer crisis pressures is shrinking and becoming hard to use
productively.
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In March1985, thepartial banking holiday associated with the failure of the
Ohio Deposit Guarantee Fund (the ODGF) sent shockwaves reverberating through
the world financial system. These shock waves contributedto the May 1985 failure
of the Maryland Savings Share InsuranceCorporation (MSSIC) two months later.
However, as it became clear that Ohio, Maryland, and federaltaxpayers were going
to pick up the bill for these failures, the system settled downagain.
This paper focuses on the ODGF,portraying it as a small-scale version of the
massively undercapitalized Federal Savings and Loan InsuranceCorporation
(FSLIC). We study the pathology of the ODGF failure andbailout to learn how the
ODGF's longstanding economic insolvency degenerated intoa crisis of confidence.
Given FSLIC's continuing economic insolvency, thisknowledge should help us to
avoid a replay of ODGF and MSSIC experience on the federallevel. At the same
time, we need to understand that the ODGF, MSSIC, and FSLIC becameinsolvent
because incentive-incompatible deposit-insurancecontracts induce undesirable
political, bureaucratic, and private risk-taking behaviors. These incentive defects
make the occurrence of de facto insolvences in associatedinsurance funds
inevitable.
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Ronald Bolton, Benson Hart and Walker Todd forhelpful discussions and the
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the Prochnow Foundation or NBER.2
The paper's central thesis is that a worldwide financial disturbance occurred,
not because of the OGDF's insolvency, but because State and federal politicians
made a surprising (albeit short-lived) attempt to duck out of what the market
conjectured to be their responsibility for backing up ODGF resources. The
temporary unwillingness of State authorities to make good the losses suffered by
ODGF amounted to their calling the equivalent of a timeout to assess the relative
willingness of State taxpayers and federal authorities to bear the costs of keeping
ODGF-insured depositors whole. In calling a prolonged banking holiday for ODGF
institutions instead of immediately recapitalizing theguarantee fund, Ohio's
Democratic governor challenged the Republican-controlled State legislature and
federal regulators and politicians to a multisidedgame of chicken. Playing out this
game confirmed market participants' longstanding presumption that in a political
showdown the concentrated interests of depositors in troubled institutions tend to
overcome the diffuse interests of the various taxpayers that the U.S. financial
system makes risk-bearers of last resort.
Although the spectacular and corrupt f allure of E.S.M. Securities and the
imprudently large exposure of Home State Savings Bank to this single credit were
the proximate causes of the ODGF's demise, the ultimate cause is the false
security that 100-percent ODGF guarantees gave to depositors in Home State
Savings Bank and to other ODGF-insured firms. As unrealized losses at ODGF
institutions grew increasingly larger than ODGFreserves, this security became
more and more illusory because it placed a correspondingly greater burden on State
regulators to oversee insured institutions ever more skillfully.
Common sense holds that it is not sensible to depend on others (particularly
politicians and bureaucrats) always to act sensibly. In driving one'scar, for
example, depending on other drivers to behave optimally is a sure formula for
eventual disaster. Using this perspective, thepaper maintains, not that the3
colorfulindividuals involved in the ODGF's demise wereblameless, but that
deposit-insurarce incentives sorely and perversely test the limits ofparticipants'
moral and financial integrity. No guarantee scheme couldendure forever whose
information, monitoring, and regulatory-response subsystems ledas many poli-
ticians, regulators, and S&L executives so deeply into temptationas the ODGF's
did. The analysis develops the premise that onlyby refusing to let the search for
individual scapegoats serve as a political palliativecan we make progress on the
vital task of building a more durable system of federaldeposit insurance.
Adam Smith notes man's natural propensity totruck, barter, and exchange.
This paper posits a parallel naturalpropensity for modern-day politicians and
bureaucrats to deny and cover-up massive insolvenciesat government-insured
financial institutions and to bailout affectedparties once a shortage is incontro-
vertably revealed. Congress' repeated resistance to adeciatelyrecapitalizing
FSLIC exemplifies this propensity. This proclivity towarddeception and myopia is
rooted in officials' desire to project a favorableimage of their capacity to control
the events that fall within their administrativepurview, their interest in develop-
ing and sharing regulatory rents, and their belief that currenttaxpayers are
relatively insensitive to the deferred costs of followingcover-up and bailout
policies. Presuming that regulators engage in self-interested,career-enhancing
conduct rather than purely altruistic behavior makes it unreasonablefor taxpayers
to expect public servants charged with managing deposit-institutioninsolvencies to
give them either an honest count or an honest deal. If taxpayerstruly want an
honest count and an honest deal, they are going to have to demandlaws that apply
sanctions to public servants that do not promptly disdose information indicativeof
poor performance.4
1. Preliminary Concepts: Insolvency, Insolvency Resolution,Runs,
and Information Suppression
Insolvency. Insolvency exists de facto when an institution loses the autonomous
capacity to discharge its liabilities. To an economist, this condition issynonymous
with an institution's net worth becoming negative. Economicinsolvency occurs
when the market value of an organization's nonequity liabilities exceeds the market
value of its assets. This definition proceeds in terms of the firm'sexpanded
balance sheet, recognizing all explicit and implicit sources of value to the firmand
all explicit and implicit nonequity claims against it. To theeconomist, the idea of
an "off-balance-sheet item" is an oxymoron (i.e., a contradiction in terms).
Accountants employ different concepts of insolvency and net worth. For
many items, accountants substitute book values (which often embody adjusted or
unadjusted historical costs) for market values and typically neglectpotentially
important categories of assets and liabilities. Rules which dictatepermissible
substitutions and omissions are embodied in what accountants call"generally
accepted accounting principles."
U.S. deposit-institution regulators' closure rules turn on aninherently more
discretionary concept of de j or legal insolvency. This concept is evenmore
amorphous than accounting insolvency. If regulators choose, theymay selectively
and asymmetrically recognize sources of income orcapital gains and defer losses
or capitalized costs that generally accepted accounting principles would treatmore
conservatively. In practice, regulators tend to focus primarily on a troubled
institution's liquidity: its capacity to cover its debts asthey come due or accrue.
Since (except in the most extreme cases of economicinsolvency) collateralized
last-resort lending from an institution's Federal Reserve or I-tome LoanBank can
maintain this capacity, using a liquidity criterionputs the legal solvency of deeply
troubled firms squarely into the hands of federal officials.
Methods of Insolvency Resolution. When a firm becomeseconomically insolvent,
the downside risk from its continuing operationsaccrues predominantly to its5
creditorsor (when thedebt isguaranteed) toits guarantors.Given their exposure
tomoralhazard in an undercapitalized firm, creditors and guarantors typically
insist on covenants that effectively give them the right eithertoacceleratetheir
claims or to take over an insolvent borrower unless its stockholders promptly inject
new capital into its balance sheet.
Because a deposit institution cannot legally operate in an officially insolvent
condition, a de jureinsolvency forces regulators to close its doors. An institution's
formal failure may be resolved in either of three ways: by a liquidation and payoff
(in which the proceeds from disposing of the firm's assets are made to satisfy
creditors and guarantors), by a private acquirer's undertaking a comprehensive or
selective asset-purchase and deposit-assumption transaction, or by a government
takeover (which is invariably conceived to be temporary). However, instead of
declaring an official insolvency, authorities may demand that stockholders go to
private capital markets to recapitalize the firm or act to bailout the firm by
providing it or its acquirer explicit or implicit financial assistance on below-market
terms. While the concept of explicit financial assistance is a straightforward one,
implicit assistance can take many and subtle forms. For a guarantor, the subtlest
and quantitatively most important form of assistance Consists of turning a blind or
nearly blind eye to a debtor's economic insolvency.It is uneconomic for a
guarantor to waive takeover options that are effectively tin the money" without
negotiating a balancing quid pro quo. Such benign neglect implicitly transfers
capital funds from the guarantor (in this case, the Ohio taxpayer) to managers,
stockholders, and unguaranteed creditors of the insolvent firm. Moreover, such
neglect sets up incentives for managers of the decapitalized firm to engage in risky
endgame plays that tend to increase the value of the implicit transfer the longer
and more completely the guarantor forbears from intervening to control its
exposure to losses from the firm's continuing operations. Forbearance occurs6
primarily becauseagentsthat are supposed to act on behalf of the guarantor find it
in their own career interest to try to deny, cover up, or use taxpayer resources
to buy their way out of particular classes of insolvency.
Home State Savings was destroyed primarily by $145 million in losses
incurred through inappropriately heavy and potentially corrupt lending to E.S.M.
Securities, Inc. (ESM). Examiners for the State first discovered this problem in
1980 when losses were still small and went on to recommend strong and immediate
action. For several years before its 1985 failure, Home State Savings was
economically insolvent. The not-insubstantial value of its stock traced to its
managers' ability to keep ODGF and State officials from closing the firm.
Although Home State's de facto insolvency and its exposure to further losses in
ESM were recognized by State examiners, the State's regulatory braintrust chose
not to enforce in full the economic interests of other ODGF's members and Ohio
taxpayers. It settled for negotiating a series of nonbinding supervisory agreements
that, until March 1985, Home State's management abrogated with virtual impunity.
Instead of getting tough with Home State management and stockholders, political
appointees at the head of the relevant state agency repeatedly temporized, leaving
the problem festering for their successor. As Home State's difficulties grew in size
and complexity, the situation became as hard to handle as a box of unstable
explosives.
Runs. What finally forced the closure of Home State Savings was a depositor run.
In talking about the abstract problem of depositor runs, authorities invariably focus
on the concept of an irrational run. An irrational run occurs when, in response to
false rumors, a substantial percentage of depositors try at the same time to7
remove their deposits from an economically solvent deposit institution. Such a run
can be stopped by a credible flow of accurate information. Customers waste
resources in that they would never have engaged in panic withdrawals if they could
have been reliably informed about the institution's true condition.
In the face of concealed insolvencies, deposit-institutionmanagers and
regulators would be better-advised to contemplate the dangers of rational runs. In
March 1985, the runs experienced in Ohio were rational, not irrational. They were
based on quick-breaking information, not on inaccurate rumors. The largest
institution in an insurance poo1 became economically so insolvent that its unrealiz-
ed losses exceeded the insurance fund set up to support not only the deposits of this
large firm, but also those issued by other members of what was a State-sponsored
insurance pool. As news of this firm's problem began to reach the public,
depositors lined up to withdraw funds first from the massively insolvent firm (and
from a second, sister institution) and eventually from several of the weakest other
institutions in the pool. Similar problems encountered in other state-sponsored
systems are described by Saulsbury (1985).
In a rational run, the time and trouble of wending one's way through a long
queue is not wasted. It represents an investment in preserving one's wealth. This
is because anyone who manages to withdraw his or her deposits before an
insolvency is officially dedared is able to escape whole. Absenting government
bailouts, depositors of record as of the instant an institution is closed have to
absorb net insufficiencies in its and its guarantors' resources.
ODGF member associations were required to hold a reserve with the ODGF
equal to two percent of their outstanding deposits. Although these institutions
were weakened by secular increases in interest rates and by the direct loss of
roughly one third of their accounting net worth in the ODGF bankruptcy, the run on
their deposits was directly occasioned by the unexpected reaction of Ohio
politicians to the official discovery of Home State Savings' insolvency.8
InOhio, at the beginning of the run, authorities acted as if it were an
irrational one. Depsite their lack of access to good information on the current
extent of Home State's insolvency, State officials dared to presume that the ODGF
could keep even its weakest client in operation. When the ODGF proved unable to
demonstrate the truth of that claim, for almost a week politicians dared to
presume that they could easily (i.e., at little cost to the Ohio taxpayer) support the
deposits of all but the massively insolvent Home State. Instead of backstopping the
resources of ODGF or its member institutions, State authorities declared the
ODGFban!upt,and the governor and legislature set up a new and grossly
undercapitalized insurance fund to support the deposits of surviving ODGF
members. Given the lack of private economic equity in many of the surviving
ODGF member institutions, the resulting deterioration in the perceived (or
conjectural) backing that Ohio politicians appeared to offer depositors in the wake
of the Home State failure made it eminently rational for depositors to line up to
take their savings out of the weakest of the Ohio-insured S&Ls.
When it became clear that many of the other ODGF firms might have to be
closed at potentially great depositor or taxpayer expense, the governor decided to
suspend operations at all 70 ODGF-insured institutions. The ostensible purpose of
this partial banking holiday was to keep all existing depositors on an equal footing
while buying time for a massive task force of examiners (borrowed largely from
federal agencies) to develop reliable information by which which regulators could
distinguish the set of roughly 20 hopelessly insolvent ODGF firms from the rest of
the pool. However, I believe that, consciously or unconsciously, this unexpected
and apparently panicky move had two deeper purposes. These purposes were to put
the ball into the Republican legislature's court and to pressure federal officials to
relieve Ohio taxpayers by contributing financial resources to an ODGF baiout9
I draw this inference for three reasons. First, the absence ofadequate
accounting information on the condition of individual institutions cannot justify a
decision to punish the managers, stockholders, and customers of the 48 sound and
the 20 unsound ODGF members alike. A more proportionedresponse would be to
impose thilar and frequency limits on depositors' withdrawal rights at ODGF firms
or to suspend operations only at firms whose solvency definitely appeared question-.
able. Second, the move's broader effects were almost certainly anticipated.By
increasing market participants' rational expectations of the probability that federal
authorities might similarly mishandle pressures on the federal insurance funds, the
banking holiday could be expected to weaken the dollar on foreign-exchange
markets and to raise deposit rates at federally insured banks and S&Ls.Extending
the damage to out-of-state parties seems a likely strategy for loosening federal
purse strings. Third, the alternative to this interpretation is to presume that Ohio
officials created so much havoc foolishly or incompetently.
Information Suppression. The element in the ODGF regulatory system that most
facilitated the coverup and most complicated the resolution of the ODGF's
insolvency is its reliance on historical-cost accounting. Post-1980 deregulation of
deposit rates could not have had a major effect on the net worth of ODGF-insured
institutions. Data analysis (to be undertaken for a later draft) should show that
these institutions, which were not subject to federal deposit-rate ceilings, had been
paying market rates of explicit interest throughout the 1970s and 1980s. At best,
they faced a shift of the focus of FSLIC-insured institutions' future competition
from implicit deposit rates (i.e., service and merchandise premiums) to explicit
deposit rates.
It is important to recognize that weaknesses in the ODGF information system
were design defects and not acts of God. If a system of market-value reporting10
hadbeen inplace and examiner ratings were public information, other ODGF
members would have felt strong economic pressure to help with the prefailure
monitoring of Home State and State officials could have determined far more
quickly and more simply which of the 68 non-Home-State institutions were strong
enough to survive without a sizeable government bailout. The determination would
have been simpler because the primary task would have become to detect the
presence or absence of fraudulent or flawed appraisals. This could have been
accomplished by checking each firm's records on a sampling basis. Solvent firms
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exhaust the institution's capital could have been reopened promptly. In this way,
customers and managers of strong, well-managed firms could have been spared
considerable suffering and examiner and regulatory resources could have been
concentrated on weak and badly managed institutions. As things were, with book
values based on historical cost, meaningful balance sheets for each institution had
to be produced virtually from scratch.
It is also important to note that, in the absence of ODGF or federal
guarantees, the 68 S&Ls in question would have had to release on a regular basis
information sufficient to convince potential depositors of their continuing solv-
ency. By assigning to State employees the task of examining in secret ODGF
institutions for insolvency, State officials reduced the natural interest of deposit-
ors and other members of the ODGF insurance pool in receiving timely information
on the financial condition and investment strategies of ODGF-insured firms. This
effectively relieved deposit-institution managers of responsibility for communicat-
ing such information to their customers and cross-guarantors.
Another way to see both the rationality of the March, 1985 run on ODGF
institutions and the way that ODGF guarantees and confidential monitoring
reduced the quality of the information that insured S&Ls passed on to their11
depositors and cross-guarantors is to look at the experience of the six completely
uninsured S&Ls that operated in Ohio at this time. To compete with government-
guaranteed firms, market discipline had long ago forced these firms to indicate
what their policies and financial condition were. One thrift (founded in 1895) had a
resolute and well-publicized policy of demanding 35percentequity on its mortgage
loans, of never making a mortgage loan that was more than 15 years in initial
maturity, and of employing a number of other well-publicized safeguards. Custom-
ers could clearly see that its cautious approach to mortgage lending preserved the
market value of its net worth. This institution was able to gain deposits when
state-insured institutions in other states were losing them and when metal safes in
which to store currency at home became impossible to buy locally.
Whenever a government-sponsored insurance corporation parcels out essential
risk-management firictions to government employees, the electorate is going to
hold politicians responsible to some extent for any problems that ensue. This
means that, no matter how long it took Ohio politicians to recognize it, the public
perceived the State to be backstopping ODGF resources.
In view of such perceptions, why do state and federal politicians permit
regulators to suppress information on the condition of insured deposit institutions?
The short answer is that suppressing this information shields elected politicians
from timely criticism for poor monitoring and regulatory performance. It also
increases the credibility of politicians' attempts to deny responsibility forany
mistakes that do emerge and leaves them asymmetrically free to bring forward
information on whatever regulatory successes their regulatory agentsmay have
achieved. In effect, restricting the flow of relevant information lessens market
pressure on politicians and regulators and creates rents for them to share. After
reviewing the details of the ODGF crisis, we return to this issue.12
2. Chronology of ODGF Crisis and Its Resolution
Table 1 provides a rough chronology of salient events in the development and
resolution of the ODGF crisis. This chronology suggests, once ESM's insolvency
surfaced, that ESM, Home State, and the ODGF fell like a line of dominoes. It
supports the view that the failure of the ODGF was a failure not of private
enterprise, but of government regulation —a failure whose resolution was made
more difficult by inadequacies in the ODGF information and regulatory-response
system.Contrary to one popularly held view, federal policies of financial
deregulation played little role in bringing about the failures of either ESM, Home
State, or the ODGF.
The chronology is also consistent with at least six potential generalizations.
First, economic insolvencies at thrift institutions and at deposit insurers seldom
develop overnight and often involve regulatory failure and managerial fraud. ESM
was insolvent de facto for at least six years and engaged in questionable
transactions from its very inception. Second, weaknesses in an insurer's informa-
lion, monitoring, and regulatory-response system encourage even honest managers
of economically insolvent firms to speculate more and more boldly the longer a de
facto insolvency persists. Third, information on the unsafe and unsound practices
of individual firms u-covered by private accountants and federal investigators does
not flow freely to state regulatory bureaus or to managers and depositors of state-
chartered S&Ls. Fourth, once an insolvency is discovered, top regulators and
elected politicians as short-termers have career-oriented incentives to deny and
cover up the insolvency. The costs of deferring the distribution of insolvency
losses may be hidden from taxpayers for at least several years and the blame for
the problem may even be shifted to representatives of the rival party, while
confronting the insolvency directly could unfairly damage politicians' and bureau-
crats' professional reputations and re-employability in the private sector. Fifth,13
TABLE 1
CHRONOLOGY OF ODGF CRISIS AND ITS RESOLUTION
1. ESM and Home State Savings
1975: ESM incorporated; announced strategy is to make sophisticated financial
plays via repurchase agreements.
Late 1976: U.S. Comptroller of the Currency finds apparent fraud at ESM. Forces
a Florida bank to unwind its dealings with it. Puts ESM on a federal blacklist.
1977-1981: ESM under investigation by SEC. Investigation was finally dropped as
too troublesome because the firm fought the agency so tenaciously.
1979: Outside Alexander Grant & Co. accountant learns of fictitious transactions.
Accepts loans from an ESM official.
3une 2, 1982: Home State concentration of loans with ESM clearly surfaces asan
issue at Ohio regulatory agency.(9-3-85 WS.) dates surfacing in draft
examination report in October 1982 by Sylvester Hentschel.) Examiner's
recommendations are overridden. Home State managers repeatedly promise
to reduce their exposure in this credit and repeatedlyrenege on these
promises.
January 28, 1985: Warner's personal balance-sheet position of $4.85 million is
closed out at ESM.
March 4, 1985: ESM fails, $300 to $350 million short.
2. The Failure of Home State Savings
March 6-8, 1985: Home State has cumulative deposit outflow of more than $150
million.
March 8, 1985: Home State signs borrowing agreement with Cleveland Fed and
takes out first loan. Announces decision to leave offices dosed on Saturday,
March 9.
March 9, 1985: An insolvency of roughly $150 mu, found in ESM. Governor
appoints conservator, claims to assign ODGF resources of roughly $134 mu.
completely to Home State f allure. Loss to other members of ODGF (who had
carried their accumulated contributions to ODGF reserves as capital) under-
mines their solvency.
March 10, 1985: Governor announces Home State will notreopen on Monday.
3. Runs at Other ODGF Members
March 11, 1985: Fed undertakes outreach program to assist surviving ODGF S&Ls
to obtain borrowing documents.
March 13, 1985: Governor and legislature establish new fund with $50 mil. in state
funds and a meaningless $40 mil. from ODGF S&Ls. Deposit outflows from
four surviving ODGF S&Ls become heavy.
March 14, 1985: Major runs occur at 6 ODGF institutions.
4. Working Out the Terms of the ODGF Bailout
March 15, 1985: Banking Holiday (Contrasts ironically with image of fun and
celebration as in film title, Holiday On Ice). Governor pats himself on back
for providing "strong leadership." Does not necessarily entail "good leader-
ship."
March 15-17, 1985: State officials attempt to solicit bids for closed institutions
from in-state and out-of-state bankers.
March 19, 1985: Game of Chicken with Feds ends. FSLIC promises to speed
processing of applications from former ODGF-insured S&Ls.
March 20, 1985:(early AM). Legislature passes bill allowing openings with
possibility of limiting customer withdrawals to $750 per month and authoriz-
ing indemnification of FSLIC for loss incurred in ODGF S&Ls through 3uly 1,1986 or 1987.Availability of Fed discount assistance to these firms is
republicizedby the Fed.
5.The Process of Reopening the ODGF Firms
March 26, 1985: 18 of the S&Ls are fullyopen, with only Home State and a few
others fully closed. Only 2 or 3 experience continuing lines ofdepositors seeking withdrawals.
April 2, 1985: Out-of-state bid for Home State announced from Chemical.Deal
said to require state to ante up at least $80 million.
April 3, 1985: Deadline for counterbids from in-state institutions. Onereceived, but later withdrawn.
April 8, 1985: 5 more institutions fully open, for a total of 39; most othersremain
partially open.
April 11, 1985:Injunction handed down against using ODGF finds to assist
Chemical Bank purchase of Home State.
April 16, 1985: Chemical bid for Home State set at roughly $50 mil. ($21mil.
entry fee plus $30 mil. in new capital) estimates $90-$129 mil. in state funds
required to keep depositors whole. (Request for state aid set at $125 mu.
after audit.)
May 2, 1985: Ohio House passes $91 million appropriation.
May 9, 1985: Ohio Senate passes $91 million bill. Issuemoves to Conference
Committee. Possibility of in-state bid from Transohio introduced inSenate bill.
May 16, 1985: Conference committee reports out a $125 mu,depositor bailout bill.
May 17, 1985: Senate deadlocks on Conference Committee bill at 16-16.A cynic
migJt interpret this as a way of advertising a vote for sale.
May 21, 1985: Bill passes Senate 17-16. Chase and Ahmanson takeovers ofother weak S&Ls is finalized.
May 29, 1985: American Financial Corporation subsidiary HunterS&L outbids
Chemical by $5 mU. Permits an in-state andnon-cross-industry acquisition to occur. To a large extent the takeover is financedby FSLIC guarantees of
Hunter. Hunter subsequently sells off 2/3 of acquired branchesto Ameritrust and First National Cincinnati Corp.
3 une 14, 1985: Horn e State officesre-open under new names.
3tne 20, 1985: Federal Court orders liquidation ofESM. Bankruptcy trustee
reports a recovery of only $23 mU. from ESM assets.
mid-December, 1985: Depositors of one institution (ValleywoodSavings Associa- tion of Cincinnati) still face limitation onmonthly withdrawals. Two
institutions have not yet reopened at all (located in Steubenvilleand DeGraf).
Late December, 1985: Closed ODGF institution in Steubenvillereopens. 3anuary 12, 1986: Last of closed ODGF institutions,People Savings of DeGraf, opens as Midwest Savings.
March 24, 1986: Valleywood officesopen under new ownership, ending the last
instance of depositor inconvenience.
6. Subsequent Legal Efforts to Designate Scapegoats and RecoverState Monies
November 6, 1986: State of Ohio wins in federal courta $34 mU. settlement from ESM's former auditor.
December 13, 1986: State grand jury indicts five Home State andESM executives
on felony charges.
March 30, 1987: State court sentences Warner to 3-1/2years in prison and orders
him to pay $22 mil. in restitution to the State.
March 31, 1987: Former Home State President, BurtonBongard, is sentenced to 10
years in prison and ordered to pay $114 mil. in restitution.
Sources: Newspaper and magazineaccounts; Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 1985 Annual Rport.
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lack of information on the market values of troubled institutions'individual assets
and liabilities makes depositor runs a rationalresponse to bad news and tends to
prolong any insolvency crisis by complicating and delaying regulatory efforts to
measure the size of asset shortfalls. Sixth, once the size of an insurer's insolvency
has been determined, political forces unleashed by theprocess of negotiating the
distribution of insurer losses across different classes oftaxpayers have a tendency
to impose especially heavy burdens on all surviving closecompetitors of the
insolvent entities.
While all six points deserve study, the first two are treatedextensively in
other sources (e.g., Kane, 1985) and the third is an obviousconsequence of bureau-
cratic competition between state and federal agencies and ofopportunities for
managers to corrupt individual accountants and investigators. Only the last three
points receive amplification here.
3. Myopic Assessments of the Benefits and Costs of Restricting Information Flows
Restricting the flow of information on insured institutions' earnings and
financial condition has the benefit foragency heads and for politicians of insulating
them to a large extent from timely outside criticism of theirperformance as
regulators. Voters can't knock what they can't see. This insulation increases public
servants' personal autonomy, their immediate opportunities forreappointment or
reelection, and their current value to potential outside employers. Having an
option to understate the number and extent of troubled firms permits regulators
and politicians to defer taking either responsibility or correctiveaction, if not
indefinitely, at least until a politically or economically more convenient time. This
option is valuable for two reasons. First, managers and stockholders of insolvent
firms may be willing to pay a high price in political contributions for authoritiesto
overlook their insolvent condition. Second, in the shortrun, the option of16
concealing a developing problem may be used to simplify the jobs of individual
regulators and politicians and cosmetically to enhance their current reputations
and immediate economic and political prospects by making their efforts appear far
more successful to outside observers than they truly are.
Delayed insolvency resolution generates financial and political costs. Avail-
able evidence indicates that continually delaying the treatment of insolvency
problems over long periods of time is bound to increase the discounted present
value of the amount of insolvency observed (Barth, et a!., 1986).Whether
recognized fully or not, the political cost of having government regulators shape
deposit institutions' information system and carry out their monitoring functions in
secret is that the public is led to hold politicians and regulators at least partly
responsible for whatever de J!insolvenciesemerge. When a massive insolvency
is observed, victimized depositors are bound to view weaknesses in the informa-
tional system and ineffective monitoring by public servants as governmental
failures for which they should be recompensed. No matter how carefully formal
arrangements may limit the government's de j obligations, the government's de
facto responsibility for overseeing the solvency of insured institutions imposes on
government officials a conjectural obligation to make good the bulk of the losses
that de i!insolvenciesthreaten to visit on individual depositors.
The frequency of Congressional and Presidential elections and the rapid
turnover of agency heads makes it reasonable for regulators and politicians to
accept a more myopic tradeoff of clear and immediate benefits for distant and
highly uncertain penalties than the representative taxpayer might be expected to
prefer. Authorities must discount potential bailout costs not only for their futurity
but also for the probability that these costs may accrue largely to rival politicians
or to the successors of current officials (who may well belong to a rival party)
rather than to themselves.This second round of discounting makes myopic
officials all the more myopic.17
4. The Rationality of Runs in the Face of Politically Managed Information Flows
During the two months of political jockeying that followed the shutdown of
the ODGF, Home State depositors who had not bothered to participate in the run
objected vociferously to being labeled "unsophisticated." Spokespersons for these
depositors claimed that their only mistake was "to believe politicians' assurances
that their money was safe." Whether or not such misplaced trust can be classified
as an archetypical form of naiveté it is clear that financially sophisticated
depositors recognized that State authorities made assurances that went beyond
their knowledge base.
Although accounting data available in March 1985 could not tell State
officials whether Home State and the ODGF were economically solvent, other
evidence suggested that these entities were at the time deeply under water. As
highly leveraged long lenders and short borrowers, most S&Ls found that the run-up
in interest rates observed since 1965 had lor.g since wiped out the economic value
of their contributed capital. For years, the continued viability of these firms
depended entirely on the credibility of deposit-insurance guarantees. In turn, the
value of these guarantees did not rest on the accumulated reserves of state and
federal deposit-insurance agencies. At all deposit-insurance agencies, reserves had
fallen below the value of the unrealized losses that a careful analyst would assess
to be potential claims against these reserves.Rather, the value of these
guarantees depended on the conjecture that, in a crisis, incumbent politicians (no
matter what their party affiliations happened to be) would invariably find it in
their joint interest to recapitalize insolvent deposit-insurance funds.
During the run on Home State and its immediate aftermath, the applicability
of this rational conjecture was undermined (albeit temporarily) in several ways.
First, anyone familiar with the information system that State regulators had to
work with recognized that the Governor's assurances as to the solvency of Home18
Stateandthe adequacyof ODGFreserves clearly exceeded his capacity to know.
This raised doubts about his veracity and his financial acumen. Second, his
political ties to Home State's chief executive officer raised the possibility that
conflicts of interest might be clouding his judgment. Third and most important,
partly because of partisan skirmishing, the Governor and legislature simultaneously
refused to backstop ODGF losses in the Home State failure and contributed only
$50millionof State fuids to a successor fund that was being asked to guarantee
almost $4 billion in deposits at the 68 surviving S&Ls. Depositors of economically
insolvent former ODGF member firms saw these actions as an attempt to get the
Ohiotaxpayer offthe hook for unrealized losses at their firms, too. Even though
engaging in arunon these institutions cost a depositor the sure time and trouble of
standing in line and establishing new depository connections,doingso would cut off
his (or her) exposure to losses from this unexpected turn in State financial policy.
Net returns to an individual from running would grow with the size of his deposit
balance and his perception of the size of the unrecorded insolvency at his State-
insured S&L. For all depositors, the incentive to withdraw deposit balances
became stronger as State politicians tried to pass the buck.
In contrast to calling a banking holiday, the accepted way to stop a run is to
keep an institution's offices open and to convince people in line and those
contemplating joining them that the firm or its guarantor is able and willing to
meet their demands. When a series of deposit institutions are simultaneously
threatened by insolvency, the government's first job parallels that of the triage
performed by medical officers in combat situations. It needs to decide formally
and in a credible manner which should close and which can safely remain open. In
implementing an indefinite banking holiday, State officials underscored their
inability to distinguish solvent institutions from insolvent ones. At the same time,
they made it harder for the stronger ODGF institutions to maintain the confidence
of their depositors or, by opening their books, to gain support from outside lenders.19
The loss of confidence spread to other state's deposit-insurance systems. In
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, for example, institutions insured by state-sponsor-
ed corporations came under pressure from March on. It is particularly instructive
to contrast the regulatory approaches followed in North Carolina and Maryland. In
North Carolina, a well-capitalized and well-run private deposit-insurance corpora-
tion acted to strengthen its system while implementing a plan to phase itself out of
the business in an orderly manner. It urged its clients to apply for federal coverage
immediately. In Maryland, authorities followed a completely opposite line of
action, claiming that for the Maryland legislature to prepare publicly for a run
would undermine faith in the Maryland system and generate more trouble than it
would save. In May 1985, Maryland found itself limiting withdrawals at state-
insured institutions when it experienced a similar insolvency at the second-largest
institution in its state-sponsored insurance system. North Carolina avoided the
systemic problems Maryland experienced. This can be attributed in part to the
unwillingness of Maryland authorities to swallow the unpleasant medicine of
producing reliable information and shoring up its troubled insurance fund in timely
fashion.
Rumors that a deposit institution or its insurer are insolvent are hard to
refute when reliable information on their current financial condition simply does
not exist. In the short term, authorities can most reliably maintain confidence not
merely by denying the insolvency, but by demonstrating their willingness to back up
the troubled entity. The more likely it is that politicians will fail to cover the
losses of any class of depositor in full and in short order, the more sensible it is for
depositors in that class to move their funds when credible flows of adverse
information occur and/or depositor runs develop. If the troubled entity either turns
out to be solvent or is bailed out with public funds, ex-depositors lose only the time
and trouble of switching their business to a new firm. However, if an institution20
they couldleaveis eventually closed on disadvantageous terms, continuing deposit-
ors' percentage exposure to losses increases with every dollar of deposits that
succeeds in leaving the firm before its demise becomes official.
5.TheDistriJxition of Bailout Costs
Resolving the Home State insolvency cost Ohio and federal taxpayers in two
ways. First, Ohio taxpayers had to kick in roughly $120 million to Hunter Savings,
which outbid Chemical Bank for the rigjit to acquire Home State's institutional
corpse. Federal taxpayers share in this burden to the extent that Ohio taxpayers
subsequently deduct the incremental taxes from their federal tax bill. Second,
taxpayers had to pay the freight for recapitalizing the weakest of the 68 unrelated
S&Ls formerly insured by the ODGF.
Because it was made essentially in cash, the first charge is easy to value.
What is hard to assess is the extent to which these costs will ultimately be
recovered as a result of legal settlements, the extent to which the incremental
taxes were shifted to federal taxpayers, and the extent to which Hunter Savings'
$26 million dollar bid was ultimately underwritten by federal taxpayers through
FSLIC guarantees of Hunter itself.(Parallel issues arise in the Steubenvile,
DeGraf, and Valleywood deals.)
Neither type of assessment is attempted here. The rest of this section seeks
instead to identify the conceptual components of the implicit costs of recapitaliz-
ing the 68 S&Ls closed in the banking holiday.
One element of this cost may be identified with the time that various
depositors of the 68 institutions were unable to withdraw deposits freely. At least
some of these depositors and some of the parties with which they wished to do
business suffered costly disruptions in their affairs. Moreover, firms that were on
the verge of dosing anyway gained the right to keep interest-rate bets on the table21
arid, with Home State depositors, were able to develop additionalpolitical leverage
on State legislators. The consequences of these further plays anddisruptions must
be counted as part of the cost of managing the ODGF failure.
A second element Consists of a reduction in the value of customer relation-
ships at each of the 68 institutions. The holiday is bound to have alienatedsome
depositors and to have persuaded others at least to diversify theirdeposit balances
over a wider class of institutions and deposit insurers. This damage is also time-
related, in that for solvent firms a speedy determination of the viability of ODGF
firms and a policy of timely triage using some form of modifieddepositor payoff
would have lessened losses of this type.
The third element consists of the ex ante cost to Ohiotaxpayers of
transferring to FSLIC future liability for guaranteeing the deposits of reopened
S&Ls. Although hard to evaluate, the present value of the interimcontingent
indemnifjcations the State promised the FSLIC on the almost-$3.8 billionin
deposits whose guarantees FSLIC took over was appreciable. The risk associated
with this gamble cannot be ignored just because the Stateappears to have won its
bet. Given the average extent of these firms? de factoundercapitalization and the
volatility of the economic environment, it is doubtful that thesecontingent
commitments could have been sold in the open market for less than 1 to 3percent
of the amount guaranteed. This implies an additional cost to Ohiotaxpayers of
between $38 and $112 million.
The fourth cost of bailing out the ODGF is perhaps the subtlest of themall.
This component consists of the capitalized value of theentry privileges that Ohio
politicians sold to out-of-state acquirers of moribund firms. Theentry fees that
Ohio politicians collected from the likes of Chase Manhattan and Ahmansoncame
out of the hides of Ohio banks and S&Ls. This is becausethey may be seen to have
owned all "beneficial" interests in the entry barriers whose conditionallifting was22
conveyed. One does not have to favor such barriers to recognize that Ohio trade
associations had won and maintained them by investments in lobbying and other
forms of political activity.Moreover, State officials may have sold these
privileges too cheaply. Putting regulatory privileges on the auction block for
distress sale is not a good way to maximize the price at which they are sold.
The fifth and final cost belongs entirely to federal taxpayers. It consists of
massive Federal Reserve and Federal Home Loan Bank System efforts to keep the
68 ODGF survivors open during the week after the Home State failure and to assist
these firms to transfer speedily to FSLIC insurance after the banking holiday,
These costs Consist of below-market lending, an enormous reallocation of federal
examination efforts, and (although FSLIC officials may not have bent their
standards in any way) lighter-than-market capital requirements that FSLIC sets in
qualifying clients.
6. Lessons for Players in the Parallel Federal Game
This paper's title asks what lessons different parties should learn from the
crisis. As a way of summarizing the previous analysis, this section lists the major
players in what is a continuing and multilayered game of deposit-insurance
"chicken" and the lessons they might draw from the ODGF debade.
Politicians and Regulators. Politicians and regulators should learn at least four
lessons.First, the absence of market-value reports (even in the form of
information that is held in confidence and not made available to the marketplace)
encourages individual insolvencies and makes them hard to unwind promptly in
cases where de facto insolvencies become public knowledge. Second, in the face of
widespread economic insolvency and the increasing perfection of financial markets,
political efforts to slip financially off the hook for unrealized deposit-institution
losses are bound to subject undercapitalized deposit-insuranceagencies to the23
pressure of client runs. Third, when the dust settles, the regulatory bureaus that
are held responsible for an observed crisis will lose clients and administrative
resources. Similarly, politicians who can be made to appear responsible will lose
future electoral support. Fourth, half-baked efforts to stop an incipient run can
easily make matters worse. In the face of a run, governmental assurances of an
institution's solvency that are not backed by reliable information can undermine
confidence in the government itself, as can inadecpiate efforts to recapitalize a
threatened insurer. The $50 million injection of State funds the Ohio legislature
first voted was so small as to insult the intelligence o most depositors. Sophisti-
cated depositors saw that the mandated S&L "contribution" of $40 million provided
no net increase in resources to the threatened firms so that, in pretending to
create a $90 million fund, State legislators were being less than forthright. $90
million was probably too little anyway. Surviving S&Ls had to write off about $76
million in capital in the ODGF shutdown. It would have been safer to establish a
fund whose aggregate size or reserve ratio equalled that of the prefailure ODGF.
This would have required at least $120 million in State funds. Given existing
surpluses in state income-tax collections and in the lottery, an appropriation of this
size could have been handled as a commitment (i.e., as a contingent liability)
without too much pain.
Politicians and regulators need to recognize that what transformed preexist-
ing structural imbalances into a full-fledged crisis was not the insolvency of Home
State Savings, but the absence of reliable information on the condition of other
ODGF—insured S&Ls and authorities' failure to enunciate in timely fashion a
credible policy for resolving the fallout of further insolvency generated by Home
State.
Unlike the Governor of Ohio, federal politicians have so far refused to face
up to the need to protect federal taxpayers from the secularly increasing costs of24
FDIC and FSLIC guarantees. As long as federal guarantees are underpriced and
unreported, risk-taking at federally insured institutions will grow. Unless meaning-
ful deposit-insurance reform is indertaken, bureaucratic breakdowns similar to
that Ohio experienced will occur eventually in the federal system. Regulators and
politicians need to think through the problems such a breakdown could create and
set up mechanisms to deal with them.
If faced with a series of official S&L insolvencies that exhaust FSLIC
reserves, a politically attractive solution that has the look of a contingency plan is
for Congress to merge FSLIC into the FDIC. Given the solvency problems that the
FDIC fund already faces on its own, I believe that merging the two funds in the
midst of a crisis in confidence might prove a recipe for disaster. Unless Congress
and taxpayers are prepared to pledge unlimited amounts of crisis aid, the only
effective alternatives are to recapitalize the federal insurance fuids and to
rationalize their information systems before a bureaucratic breakdown actually
occurs.
Taxpayers (Including W eli-Capitalized Deposit Institutions). Appropriate lessons
for federal taxpayers are equally harsh. The initial unwillingness of State
authorities to back the ODGF reflects their closeness to taxpayers. Ohio
politicians recognized that Ohio taxpayers didn't want to be riskbearers of last
resort. However, at federal level, taxpayer obligations are more diffuse. The cost
of FDIC and FSLIC guarantees has not yet surfaced as a political issue.
The first lesson for taxpayers to learn is that contingent government
guarantees are not costless.This can be brought out in cartoon fashion by
picturing Ohio politicians as marrying insolvent ODGF institutions en masse to
FSLIC and various institutional acquirers while ODGF depositors cheer and bound
and gagged taxpayers and Ohio banks grimace in pain. To bring deposit-insurance25
costsback under control, the market value of each insurance fund'scontingent
guarantees could be reported regularly in ways that taxpayers can understand and
monitor.
The second lesson is that, when the burden of bearing unrealized losses is
finally distributed, some taxpayers are bound to be hit harder than others. The
most exposed taxpayers figure to be surviving close competitors of the institutions
whose losses actually bring down the system. Firms of the same institutionaltype
as those who fail must expect to face higher post-failure insurance fees, while they
and other close competitors will watch legislators and regulators sell off hard
earned regulatory privileges to entrants from outside the industry. Topreserve
their capital and markets in the long run, economically solvent institutionsmight
begin to push for deposit-insurance reform.
It is important to note that in part healthy ODGF institutions contributed to
their own victimization. It is hard to believe that all of them could have failed to
learn of Home State's problems with ESM. As members of an insurancepool that
required them to guarantee one another's liabilities, they faced incentives to
monitor one another and to press for timely resolution of developing insolvencies.
In the absence of an adequate State regulatoryresponse to their whistle blowing,
solvent institutions might have petitioned to switch their insurance to the FSLICor
(even better) the FDIC. In addition, well before any run actuallybegan, ODGF
firms might have established a continuing borrowingagreement with the Cleveland
Fed as authorized by the 1980 Depository Institutions Deregulation andMonetary
Control Act.
Depositors. The principal lesson for depositors is that insured deposits are not
necessarily riskless, even when they are issued by an apparently well-capitalized
firm. During the Ohio banking holiday depositors at economically solvent ODGF26
firms were held hostage to the interests of Ohio taxpayers and economically
insolvent members of the ODGF insurance pool. To cope with deposit risk,
depositors may want to diversify their funds across insurers and to demand
information from their bank or savings institution that can let them assess for
themselves what constitutes an adequate risk premium on the deposits they hold.27
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